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Abstract. The advanced development of the Internet facilitates efficient 
information exchange while also been exploited by adversaries. Intrusion 
detection system (IDS) as an important defense component of network security 
has always been widely studied in security research. However, research on 
intrusion prediction, which is more critical for network security, is received less 
attention. We argue that the advanced anticipation and timely impede of invasion 
is more vital than simple alarms in security defenses. General research methods 
regarding prediction are analyzing short term of system-calls to predict 
forthcoming abnormal behaviors. In this paper we take advantages of the 
remarkable performance of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) in dealing with 
long sequential problem, introducing the sequence-to-sequence model into our 
intrusion prediction work. By semantic modeling system-calls we build a robust 
system-call sequence-to-sequence prediction model. With taking the system-call 
traces invoked during the program running as known prerequisite, our model 
predicts sequence of system-calls that is most likely to be executed in a near 
future period of time that enabled the ability of monitoring system status and 
prophesying the intrusion behaviors. Our experiments show that the predict 
method proposed in this paper achieved well prediction performance on ADFA-
LD intrusion detection test data set. Moreover, the predicted sequence, combined 
with the known invoked traces of system, significantly improves the performance 
of intrusion detection verified on various classifiers. 
Keywords: anomaly intrusion detection, recurrent neural networks, 
sequence-to-sequence, system-call. 
1 Introduction 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) [1] are critical components with respect to security 
defenses of the networks. Traditional IDS, whether signature-based or anomaly-based, 
adopts intrusion detection technology based on certain model patterns. Signature-based 
methods match the system behaviors against the known attack patterns, while anomaly-
based techniques build the system behavior models through prior knowledge to identify 
deviations. Both the two methods possess vulnerabilities, signature-based IDS lack the 
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ability to detect zero-day attack, while anomaly-based IDS receive criticisms for its 
inherent property of yielding high false alarm rate.  
Analyzing system-call traces which invoked by the running programs to discriminate 
normal and abnormal behaviors was first introduced by Forrest et al. [2]. Former 
anomaly intrusion detection approaches which focus on characterizing normal activities 
were less stable for the erratic user behaviors. Then in their subsequent works they 
define normal profile using short sequences of system-calls. With neural networks 
gained state-of-the-art performance in dealing with computer vision and natural 
language processing problems, researchers recently introduce neural networks in 
system call modeling [3], while most of which are dealing the frequency features of   
individual system-calls. In other words, they did not consider the semantic meaning of 
system-calls. More importantly, those methods unable have the ability to identify the 
intrusion intention of the malicious attacks. The concern of system-calls has been a vital 
research target of intrusion detection and the system-call sequences imply the program 
characteristics. Our work will implement on the system-call sequences. 
In real network environment, the normal operation of the host nodes is vital to the 
system, any hostile attacks that destruct the service running will result in huge amount 
of asset loss. Therefore, it is not enough to alert the intrusion activities only. It needs 
method to monitor the program running status and predict the possible intrusion 
behaviors which would thread the stability and health of the networks. 
To solve the above problem, in this paper we construct an end-to-end neural network 
[4] system-call prediction [5] model, which predicts the follow-up invoked system-calls 
based on the system-call traces that have been executed during the malicious process 
running. The predicted sequence is that the attack program is most likely to execute 
within a certain period of time. 
System-call prediction is hard work for the arbitrary execute of those running 
programs, previous works use dynamic Bayesian network or hidden Markov model to 
predict sliding windowed system-calls. Those algorithms have long been criticized for 
their difficulty in calculating and the poor performance which caused by their short 
dependency on previous system-calls. 
Much like human communicate with each other through languages constructed with 
certain grammar and syntax, processes achieve intention with specific system-call 
sequences. With the high similarity between natural human languages and system-call 
sequences, we employ the language model [6] to model the system calls. Because RNN 
is suitable for solving sequential problems, and it has significant performance in natural 
language processing research, such as Q&A and machine translation, we take 
advantages of the RNNs’ sequence-to-sequence framework [7] to construct our system-
call sequence prediction model.  
The advantage of the method proposed in this paper lies in that it not only detects 
the malicious system-call sequence in real time, also predicts the possible system-call 
sequence at the next moment based on the given context. Most important of all, our 
work models the semantic meaning of system calls so that we can analyze sequences in 
sentence level. Then we can extract the abstract features of the system-call traces, 
thereby enhancing the accuracy and robustness of the anomaly detection. The 
contributions of this paper are as follows: 
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1) Employing RNNs language model to model system-calls which addresses the 
long temporal dependency problem, then applying sequence-to-sequence 
framework to generate predicted sequences conditioned on the given system-
call context. 
2) Improving the performance of anomaly intrusion detection system with lower 
false alarm rate by using the predicted sequences. 
3) Addressing the defect of unable to make intrusion prediction and identifying the 
intrusion intention of the malicious adversary by constructing the system-call 
sequence predict model. 
The follow-up parts of this article will be organized as follows: Section II. Describes 
related work, Section III. Explains our prediction model in detail, Section IV. 
Experiments and analysis of results and Section V. Conclusions. 
2 Related Work 
2.1 Intrusion Detection and Prediction 
Forrest et al. [1, 2] first introduced system calls into anomaly intrusion system research 
works. In their proposed methods, ‘normal’ was defined by short-range correlations in 
a process’s system call. Later they detected intrusions with short system-call sequences. 
Neural networks have recently been applied to improve the performance of intrusion 
detection systems [8, 9, 10]. Staudemeyer et al. [9] applied LSTM neural network to 
intrusion detection and achieved preferable results on KDD cup99 dataset. Kim et al. 
[10] further introduced the RNNs language model into anomaly intrusion detection 
system construct and outperformed previous methods. However, as fore mentioned, 
those intrusion detection technologies can only determine the intrusion activities that 
have occurred, nevertheless have no ability to neither forewarn the forthcoming 
invasion nor predict the subsequence of the malwares. 
With respect to intrusion prediction, Feng et al. [11] proposed dynamic Bayesian 
networks to predict the subsequent actions and analyze intentions of the intruders based 
on system-calls. Zhang et al. [12] developed a hidden semi-Markov model method for 
predicting the anomaly events and the intentions of possible intruders to a computer 
system based on the observation of system-call sequences. Li et al. [14] constructed a 
network attack graph based on correlation analysis of large intrusion alerts then 
calculated the probability of each attack scenario in the graph node, that is, the 
probability of each attack scenario as a precursor to a future attack scenario. Most 
researchers use Hidden Markov Models [12, 13] to associate observed status with 
aggressive behaviors and use the transition probabilities to predict the next stage of 
intrusion behavior. There are quite a number of weaknesses in this approach. The first 
is the limited dependence on the sequence. The information on which the next attack is 
based are only with short steps. This will inevitably lose certain important information 
that contribute to the prediction result. Second, HMM can easily converge to local 
optimal point, which makes it difficult to find the accuracy prediction results. 
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2.2 RNNs Language Model 
Recurrent neural networks have natural advantages in dealing with sequential data for 
its introducing cycles in their computational graph. The recurrent neural network 
contains a hidden state whose value is determined by the current time step input and 
the hidden state value of the previous time. 
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Fig. 1. the recurrent neural network model 
Therefore, the output of each time step of the RNNs contains the information about 
the past inputs. If the recurrent neural network is expanded according to time series, it 
can be seen as a neural network whose depth is the length of the sequential inputs, and 
inputs of each hidden layer are the corresponding time step of original sequential data 
and the output of the previous layer. Fig. 1 shows the simple structure of recurrent 
neural networks. 
Vanilla recurrent neural networks are trained with Backpropagation through time 
(BPTT) [15] algorithm, and it can in principle memorize information for infinitely long 
sequence. However, training models with long inputs will suffer from the problems of 
gradient vanishing or gradient explosion [16, 17]. The long short-term memory (LSTM) 
[18] and gated recurrent unit (GRU) [19] memory networks have the ability to 
remember important information of the long sequence by training the parameters of the 
input gate, forget gate, and output gate, which solving the problem of long-term 
dependency to a certain extent. Compared with LSTM, GRU has a simpler structure 
and can reduce the parameters needed to train. Chung et al. [20] evaluated GRU in 
various data set to found that it achieved the same performance against LSTM. For this 
reason, in this paper we choose GRU as the RNNs implement unit in our system-call 
prediction model. 
The language model [21] can be expressed as the probability of a word sequence be 
a sensible sentence, and the language model can be represented by the conditioned 
probability of the next word given all the previous ones. The formula is as follows: 
?̂?(𝑤1
𝑇) = ∏ ?̂?(𝑤𝑡|𝑤𝑡
𝑡−1)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (1) 
 
where 𝑤𝑡  stands for the t𝑡ℎ word in the sequence, and T = (𝑤1 , 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑡) is the 
given sentence. The recurrent neural network language model [22] has achieved great 
success in the fields of text generation and machine translation. It is an important part 
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of the sequence-to-sequence model and determines the semantic rationality of the 
predicted word sequence. Taking the advantage of the generality nature of RNNs 
language model, we employ it to the system-call generation situation in this paper. 
3 System-call Sequence-to-Sequence Model 
3.1 Overview of Our Approach 
The System-call Sequence-to-sequence model is modeling system-calls with sequence-
to-sequence approach. Fig. 2 shows the overview of our proposed mothed, there are 
mainly two parts of our method. First, to fulfill our object of solving the shortcomings 
mentioned above of anomaly detection systems as well as handling the short 
dependency problems in existed system-call prediction algorithms, we proposed a 
sequence-to-sequence recurrent system-call prediction model. Second, to improve the 
performance of baseline intrusion detection classifiers, we combined the predicted 
sequence as a supplementary part with invoked sequence to form an extended input. As 
show in Fig. 2, the predicted sequence supplies the classifiers extra information to 
enhance the ability to define the system-call sequence nature. 
 
Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed method. 
3.2 Prediction Model 
We treat the system-call traces generated during program execution as language 
sentences which used by the process to communicate with operation system, we apply 
the RNNs language model as the system-call generator to ensure that we produce 
semantically reasonable sequences. By introducing the sequence-to-sequence 
framework which well performed in natural language processing, we feed the input 
system-call sequence as the context information to generate the correct prediction 
output related to the input sequence. 
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The sequence-to-sequence model is essentially a RNNs implementation of the 
encoder-decoder framework [23], and it can be viewed as a sentence-to-sentence 
mapping. Machine translation is a mapping of one language sentence to another, and 
the Q&A system is sentence mapping between the same languages. 
The idea of encoder and decoder is a simulation of the way that human thinking. 
When answering a question, we usually understand the question first, and then construct 
the answer statement based on the content we understanding. In the same way, we 
divide a system-call trace into two segments according to its invoking order. We can 
treat the first part, which we call it source sequence, as a question statement in a Q&A 
system, and the second part, called target, as an answer statement. In fact, different 
proportions of the source and target can be set to divide the traces. We adopt dynamic 
proportional segmentation, that is, the ratio of input sequence length to output sequence 
length changes dynamically. Based on this idea, we construct the training data set of 
the sequence-to-sequence model. We divide 80% of the data set for training and 20% 
for evaluating. 
Generally, a vocabulary of words is needed to accommodate all the words that may 
appear in the sentence. Similarly, we need to construct corresponding system-call word 
vocabulary when using the sequence-to-sequence prediction model. It is certain that the 
total number of system calls in the host is determined, assuming that is m. We define S 
as a set of all system calls provided in an operating system. We number each system 
call, then get the total S = {1, 2, ..., m}. The source system-call sequence s then will be 
represented as: s = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3,..., 𝑥𝑛), and the target as: t = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3,..., 𝑦𝑚), where 
𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖  ∈ S. 
We analyze in detail about how our sequence-to-sequence system-call prediction 
model working. As shown in Fig. 3, given a system-call sequence （𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … , 𝑥𝑛), 
the encoder completes a forward propagation operation to generate the hidden state and 
output at each moment in time. The formula is as follows: 
 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚(𝑤
𝐻𝑋𝑥𝑡 + 𝑤
𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑡−1)  (2) 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑤
𝑌𝐻ℎ𝑡   (3) 
The hidden state ℎ𝑡 of the last moment was token as the encoded information vector 
c of the input system-call sequence. We call it the context vector, which will be used as 
the initial hidden state of the decoder and will affect each moment of the output of the 
decoder. 
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Fig. 3. the system-call sequence-to-sequence prediction model. 
The decoder generates the target sequence t according to the context vector c, the 
decoder itself is essentially a standard recurrent neural network language model 
aforementioned, and the initial hidden state of the decoder is the context vector c. The 
process of generating each system-call requires the participation of hidden state 𝐻𝑡 , 
also the system-call 𝑦𝑡  decoded at the previous moment. The condition probability of 
the decoder as follows: 
𝑝(𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑇′|𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑇) =  ∏ 𝑝(𝑦𝑡|𝑐, 𝑦1 , … , 𝑦𝑡−1)
𝑇′
𝑡=1
 (4) 
Although the model architecture Fig. 3 shown possesses certain capability to 
mapping sequence, there still some shortcomings. First, the input sentence information 
is encoded into a fixed vector in the encoding stage, which leads to the loss of certain 
information, the system-calls lying in the back position of input sequence may dilute 
the information of the previous ones. Second, the context vector c relied during 
decoding process is constant. That is to say, each system-call in the source sequence is 
viewed as the same without emphasis in the process of decoding. 
In fact, we think that some specific system-calls will better reflect the program's 
intentions. Therefore, in order to emphasize the impact of those system-calls to the 
specific system-call decoding, we introduce the attention mechanism [23] into our 
system-call sequence prediction model. 
The model with attention mechanism introduced has no change during the encoding 
stage. In the decoding stage, it will no longer rely on the context vector c, but instead 
take the information of the inputs which are most contributed when decoding each 
system-call. The model architecture with attention was shown in Fig. 4. Then the 
conditioned probability formula of decoder changed: 
𝑝(𝑦𝑖|𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑖−1, X) =  𝑔(𝑦𝑖−1, 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖) (5) 
where 𝑐𝑖  stand for the current context information vector which calculated with 
attention algorithm learned during training and is calculated as the follows: 
𝑐𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑗
𝑇𝑥
𝑗=1
 (6) 
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where 𝑎𝑖𝑗  is normalized coefficient which weight each hidden state ℎ𝑗 of time step 
j contribute to the current context vector 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑎𝑖𝑗  is calculated as: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
exp (𝑒𝑖𝑗)
∑ exp (𝑒𝑖𝑘)
𝑇𝑥
𝑘=1
 (7) 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑗 stands for the association relationship between the input element 𝑥𝑖 and 
the current output element 𝑦𝑖, which should be learned during the training phase. 
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Fig. 4. the system-call sequence-to-sequence prediction model with attention. 
By introducing attention mechanism, we enable the model to emphasize the 
influence of a particular system-call on the nature of a sequence, so it can better predict 
the actions that are most likely to occur in the next stage of the call sequence. 
The performance of RNNs is relevant to the scale of training data set. In fact, because 
the abnormal system-call traces are less than the normal, the training input data 
constructed with ADFA-LD is slightly insufficient. For example, if we choose a 
sequence length of 25, we can only gain around 5000 pairs of input sequences. The 
approach we take to augment training data is to construct different training sequences 
by adjusting the length of system-call traces. We construct data set with sequence length 
of 10, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 25 and 30, respectively. In the end, we got more than 60,000 
training data. On the other hand, the system-call traces during an intrusion period are 
confused with some other processes, the start and the termination boundary of a certain 
process are ambiguous. Therefore, it is necessary to take a longer sequence to extract 
the attack characteristics. By changing the length of the sequence, we can better capture 
the characteristics of the specific running process and achieve better predict results. 
Table 1. training system-call traces generated with various length 
 
Train Test 
Traces length Pairs Traces length Pairs 
10 8000 10 1600 
12 7500 12 1500 
15 7000 15 1400 
  18 6500 18 1210 
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20 6000 20 1200 
22 5500 22 1100 
25 5000 25 1000 
30 4000 30 800 
 
4 Experiment and Evaluation 
We evaluate our model on our constructing evaluating data set. we apply the BELU 
[24] score, a benchmark widely used in machine translation, to evaluate our model 
performance. Also, we calculate the Euclidean distance of the encoded semantic vector 
between the model output and validation. In addition, the TD-IDF algorithm is 
employed in our work to evaluate the similarity between the predicted sequence and 
the validation. For comparison, we also train the standard recurrent neural network 
language model to generate a predictive sequence that compares with our predictive 
model. 
In general, there are differences between the sequence predicted and the sequence of 
the real system-call. The system-call traces are affected by the processes running on the 
system, the hardware of the services, and the duration of the intrusion activities. 
However, it can be determined that the properties of system-call sequence predicted for 
a particular attack is consistence with the target sequence. To verify that our model 
predicts sequences with the same functionality of the target, we employ multiple 
anomaly detection classifiers to evaluate the predicted sequences, the results denote that 
our model well predicted the follow-up actions of those intrusion programs. What’s 
more, we analyze the sequences which are composed of the predicted and the invoked 
to enhance the performance of anomaly intrusion detection, which means that our 
model has the ability to foresee the upcoming intrusions. 
4.1 Dataset 
The training data set is constructed on the ADFA-LD [25] provided by National 
Defense University of Australia, which consists of system-call traces gathered during 
normal and intrusion programs running. There are 746 files containing 6 types of 
attacks, 833 normal training files, and 4372 normal validation files. 
Table 2. overall description of the ADFA-LD traces files 
Type Traces files 
Normal train 833 
Normal validation 4373 
Hydra_FTP 162 
Hydra_SSH 176 
Adduser 91 
Java_Meterpreter 124 
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Meterpreter 75 
Web_Shell 118 
 
Compared to the early UNM and DARPA data sets, ADFA is the latest, the attack 
pattern of experiment is more in line with the modern attack means, which indicates 
that the data is more consistent with the actual network environment. And the scale of 
the data set is large enough to be suitable for training neural network. The ADFA-LD 
data set is mainly to solve the problem which the early intrusion detection evaluation 
data set is not consistent with actual network environment. Creech et al. [25] introduces 
the structure, generation and experiment process of the ADFA-LD in detail, then their 
subsequent work [26] proposed a semantic approach to anomaly intrusion detection 
system using system-call patterns. And in [27] they proposed algorithm to build a host-
based anomaly intrusion detection system, and preliminarily analyzed the data set. 
4.2 Experiment Setup 
In the training of neural networks, the selection of hyper-parameters often plays a 
critical role in the model convergence. The hyper parameters include: 
1.  the initialization of training model parameters, 
2.  learning rate, 
3.  batch size for min-batch optimization, 
4.  dropout applied to regularize model, 
5.  the number of neural nodes in the hidden layer of neural network. 
There is no theoretical method to guide the determination of hyper parameters in the 
literature regarding deep learning. In general, there is a certain kind of experience to 
determine the appropriate hyper parameters for the model. For example, in the 
initialization of the parameters, the smaller random numbers distributed between 0 and 
1 are generally chosen, and the learning rate can be decreased during the training 
iteration. 
In our experiment, four models with various structures are trained as prediction 
models, including GRU unit of single hidden layer, two hidden layers and three hidden 
layers with learning rate of 0.001, and three hidden layers with learning rate of 0.1 
respectively. The number of neural nodes in hidden layers of each model is 256, and 
the input dimension keeps the same with the hidden layer, which is due to the output of 
the GRU hidden layer is the input of the next layer. At the same time, the dropout is set 
to 0.5 to regularize the model. The maximum gradient clipped threshold is set to 5. The 
size of the training batch is 64. We adapt the early stop method to train models, when 
the current training loss no longer declines, the training is completed. The bucket 
strategy is employed to put the similar length sequence into the same size bucket, so as 
to reduce the paddings of training sequence and make the neural network training more 
efficient. 
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4.3 Result Analysis 
First, we use the BELU score to evaluate our trained model performance. We use the 
target sequence in the test set as reference sequence. The BELU of the prediction 
sequence is calculated for different models of the hyper parameters.  
Table 3. BELU scores of the four models with different structures 
Model BELU score 
GRU-1, lr=0.1 20.2 
GRU-2, lr=0.1 38.5 
GRU-3, lr=0.1 40.5 
GRU-3, lr=0.001 40.4 
  
Table 3 denotes that when the learning rate keeping the same, the difference of 
BELU score between the number of hidden layers in the model is huge, which 
demonstrates that the increase of hidden layers can result in better performance. On the 
other hand, we can see that the difference of the initial learning rate in this experiment 
did not much affect the convergence of the model. It can be explained that we adopted 
the strategy that dynamically reduces the learning rate during training phase according 
to the training loss. According to the results, we can set a relatively large learning rate 
to accelerate the convergence speed of the model and reduce the training time. 
In addition, we train various lengths of input sequences to enhance the robustness of 
the model. We classify the sequence according to the length and calculate the BELU 
score.  
   
Fig. 5. the BELU score calculated with various lengths of predicted sequence. Left comparing 
the models with 1, 2, 3 hidden layers and learning rate keep in 0.001. Right comparing the 
models with the same 3 hidden layers while learning rate 0.1 and 0.001 respectively.  
According to Fig. 5, we can see that when the sequence length is within 35, the value 
of BELU is positive proportion to the input length. It can be explained that our 
prediction model obtains more effective information by increasing the length of the 
input sequence, so that the results can be predicted more accurately. When the sequence 
length continues to grow, the BELU value will decline, which is due to the limitation 
of GRU memory, the system-call back position in the sequence dilute the information 
of the previous system calls causing the loss of information, and then the prediction 
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errors increased. Therefore, when using the model, one need to choose appropriate 
length of the system-call sequence as input. In the other hand, we know that the 
influence of neural network depth on the model is huge. 
In fact, the BELU indicators consider only the number of co-occurrences of N-tuples 
in the predicted sequence and the target sequence. The semantic information of the 
sequence is not considered. Generally speaking, there are key words existed in a 
sentence. Similarly, we deem that some specific sequences of system-call determine 
the characteristic of certain sequence. The TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse document 
frequency) model which widely used in information retrieval and data mining can well 
help us find the system calls that contribute to identify the sequence. This model 
extracts the key words of the statement by weighting the sequence specific words. We 
measure the similarity between the predicted sequence and the target sequence by this 
method. Fig. 6 (a) demonstrates that the predicted sequence well coincides with the 
target sequence in some syntactic level. 
 
(a)                                 (b) 
Fig. 6.  The left represents the sequence similarity calculated using TF-IDF model. The right 
represents the semantic similarity calculated the cosine value of the two encoded vectors. 
curves represent different hyper-parameter models. 
The disadvantage of both BELU and TF-IDF is that only the text similarity is 
considered, BELU considers the number of N tuples in the two sequence, and TF-IDF 
considers the similarity of the sentence key words. However, the similarity measure of 
sequence semantics can better evaluate the correlation of the two sequences. We take 
the final hidden state as the semantic encoding vector 𝒗𝟏 of prediction sequence, we 
do the same operation of the target sequence to get the corresponding semantic vector 
𝒗𝟐. Then, we calculate the cosine value between the vectors. Based on the result of fig. 
6, we demonstrate that the predicted system-call sequences of the model are very close 
to the target sequences both at the syntactic and the semantic level in certain range of 
prediction length. 
One critical evaluation criterion of the predicted sequence is that it should keep the 
same functionality with the target, in other words, it should gain the similar 
performance tested under baseline anomaly detection classifiers. In order to verify our 
model, we evaluated the predicted sequence using classifiers including CNNs, RNNs, 
SVM and Random Forest. The ROC curve is applied to measure the detect performance 
13 
of the predict sequence. Fig. 7 demonstrate that the predicted sequences show the 
remarkable performance towards those classifiers. Compare with the target sequence, 
the AUC score is with little decline of average 0.1, that means that our model well 
predicts the most likely system-call sequence with a high accuracy with regarding to 
sequence functionality. 
 
Fig. 7.  ROC curves drawn with the four intrusion detection classifiers, blue line is evaluated 
on the target sequence, red line is evaluated on the predicted sequence  
4.4 Enhancement of Anomaly Detection 
There is another important benefit of predict model is that, with the predicted sequence, 
the anomaly detect system improve the intrusion detect ability with combining the 
original sequence. 
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Fig. 8.  ROC curves drawn with the four intrusion detection classifiers, blue line is evaluated 
on the target sequence, red line is evaluated on the predicted sequence, yellow line is evaluated 
on the extended sequence of the target and predicted.  
We find from Fig. 8 that the extended sequence performs better than the original 
target sequence. We argue that this is because our prediction sequence captures the 
abnormal behavior characteristics of the existing sequence and predicts the sequence of 
subsequent behavior reasonably, thus helping the classification model to make better 
anomaly detection. 
5 Conclusion 
In order to solve the defect of the intrusion detection system’s unable to predict 
intrusion behavior, the recurrent neural network sequence-to-sequence framework is 
introduced in our work. With the trained model, we can efficiently predict the reliable 
system-call sequence according to the invoked system-call sequence during the process 
running. The model is validated by evaluate the predict accuracy through various 
benchmark methods. On the other hand, by extending the system-calls sequence with 
the model predicted sequence we improve significantly the performance of anomaly 
detection algorithms. Future works will include enhancing the model robustness against 
adversarial samples and validating the portability performance on other data sets of our 
prediction model. 
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